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THE LIABILITY OF BLOOD BANKS AND
MANUFACTURERS OF CLOTTING

PRODUCTS TO RECIPIENTS OF HIVINFECTED BLOOD: A COMPARISON OF

THE LAW AND REACTION IN THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN,
IRELAND, AND AUSTRALIA
JOSEPH KELLY*

It is uncontroverted that, within the United States, the first
HIV transfusion lawsuits were filed in 1985. Presently, there are
between three hundred and five hundred pending lawsuits, 1 almost
all of which involve persons infected with HIV. The suits generally
arose from patient exposures to infected blood plasma or to blood
transfusions administered before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the test for HIV antibodies in March 1985.2 In
most cases, defendants have been successful, especially on motions
for summary judgment. In fact, a 1990 survey by the American
Association of Blood Banks (AABB), shows that less than a dozen
* Joseph Kelly is an Assistant Professor of Business at State University
College at Buffalo. Dr. Kelly has served on the faculty of the National Judicial
College from 1986 to 1990, and was on the faculty of an employment law seminar sponsored by the North Dakota Supreme Court in October 1988. From
1985 to 1992, he was co-Chair of the International Bar Association Section on

Sports and Gaming Law. He has published numerous law review articles on
transnational legal topics. He has been a featured speaker at International Bar
Association Conferences in Buenos Aires, Cannes, Montreal, and New York. He
received his J.D., cum laude, from Northern Illinois University College of Law
and his Ph.D. from Loyola University of Chicago.
The author discussed some of the issues in this Article at a meeting of the
International Bar Association, Medicine and the Law Committee, in October
1993.
1. Cynthia Kelly & John P. Barber, Legal Issues in Transfusion Medicine:
Is Blood Banking a Medical Profession?, 12 CLINICS IN LAB. MED. 819, 819-20

(1992). Some estimate that at least one-half of American hemophiliacs are
HIV-infected and some, regrettably, have infected their spouses. Reginald
Rhein, Jr., et al., FreeingHemophiliacs From the Risk of AIDS, Bus. WK., Mar.

13, 1987, at 38.
2. Notwithstanding the present HIV/AIDS test, there is no 100% guaranty
of transfusion safety because of the estimated three-month "window period" between the time of infection and the time of the production of antibodies. The
FDA suggests the present risk of transmission is between 1 in 38,000 and 1 in

153,000. 58 Fed. Reg. 34,962 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 606, 610)
(proposed June 30, 1993).
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cases resulted in awards for the plaintiffs. 3 Unlike the United
States, other countries have reduced litigation drastically by providing government payments to HIV transfusion victims. This Article compares litigation in the United States with litigation and
other alternatives in Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and Australia.
This Article compares the law and trends in HIV-infected blood
product litigation within the United States, Canada, Great Britain,
Ireland, and Australia. Part I discusses the heavy burdens which
face the HIV-infected plaintiff in American courts. Part I further
provides a chronological summary of the discovery of HIV/AIDS and
its relation to HIV-infected blood product litigation. Part II describes the recent developments in Canadian tainted blood litigation. Part III addresses the response of Great Britain and Ireland
to HIV-infected blood product litigation. Finally, Part IV analyzes
the history of the problem in Australian courts, as well as the Australian government's initiatives.
I.

UNITED STATES

Unlike the perhaps irrational blame attached to gays and drug
addicts who become HIV positive through unsafe sex or needle
sharing, everyone considers the victim infected with HIV by transfusion or by plasma to be "innocent."4 It is no accident that California named the Paul Gann Blood Safety Act after a man who died
from HIV/AIDS complications after receiving an HIV-infected
transfusion. 5 Nevertheless, the plaintiff in these blood products
cases must surmount heavy burdens in order to succeed in American courts.
The widespread sympathy for these HIV victims has not generally resulted in remuneration through successful litigation. The
time consuming nature of litigation often exacerbates the plaintiffs
problem because HIV transfusion litigation can be very time consuming. The length of a lawsuit is especially important when a
plaintiff has a terminal illness. Litigation generally occurs in federal court either because this is mandatory when the American Red
Cross is a defendant, 6 or because a blood bank or blood products
3. Kelly & Barber, supra note 1, at 820.
4. "Clearly a plaintiffs case arouses sympathy for the 'innocent' manner in
which he became ill." Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 333 (N.J. 1991) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1645 (West 1994). The Gann Act requires the medical professional to talk with patients about blood donor options
such as using one's own blood or asking acquaintances to donate. Id.
6. Plaintiffs must sue the American Red Cross in a federal court which
will apply state law. American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2472
(1992). The Supreme Court concluded that the American National Red Cross'
Charter, 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) provides original federal jurisdiction for all cases

in which the Red Cross is a party. Id. The American Red Cross collects about
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defendant will remove the case to a federal court based on diversity.7 This may necessitate a time-consuming procedure when a
federal judge has to determine whether a state medical protection
statute protects a blood bank or blood products defendant. Such
statutes may,-among other provisions, have a shorter statute of limitations or repose, or somehow restrain the scope of plaintiffs
8
discovery.
A significant minority of jurisdictions have concluded that
these medical protection statutes may protect blood banks when
they bar a plaintiffs cause of action before he or she was even
aware of the HIV-infection. 9 In Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., the plaintiff contracted HIV/AIDS through a 1984 transfusion, but was unaware of her infection until 1989.10 The federal
judge, applying state law, dismissed her claim of negligent provision of blood because of Tennessee's three-year statute of repose."
The judge did certify that issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and suggested it certify the question to
the Tennessee Supreme Court. 12 Needless to say, this time-consuming procedure is of minimum value to the HIV positive
13
plaintiff.
one-half of all donated blood in the United States. United Blood Servs. v.
Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 513 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
7. S.G., 112 S.Ct. at 2472.
8. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West 1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105
(Vernon 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (1980).
9. Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 746, 747 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993); see also Doe v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc., 614 So. 2d
1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality of Florida's
Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose); Smith v. Paslode Corp., 799 F. Supp.
960, 963 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (upholding the Missouri Blood Shield statute in the
face of a constitutional challenge), modified, 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir. 1993). In
Smith, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the Red
Cross was negligent in performing its look-back procedures. 7 F.3d at 119.
The American Red Cross is a health care professional and thus within the
medical statute of limitations. Smith, 799 F. Supp. at 966. A shorter Statute of
Limitations clearly protects the Red Cross. Other courts hold that the Statute
of Limitations does not include blood banks and that the sale of blood is not the
practice of medicine. Silva v. Southwest Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184,
1188-89 (Fla. 1992); see also J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. v. Beeson,
835 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the Texas' Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act does not allow a shorter Statute of Limitations for blood banks).
10. Estate of Doe, 824 F. Supp. at 747.
11. Id. at 751.
12. Id.
13. See Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 965 F.2d 991, 993 (11th Cir.
1992) (certifying the question of limitations to the Georgia Supreme Court).
The Georgia Supreme Court eventually held that its limitations period applied
in 1993 to effectively bar the plaintiffs suit. Bradway v. American Nat'l Red
Cross, 426 S.E.2d 849, 852 (Ga. 1993).
In Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 938 F.2d 90, 93-94
(8th cir. 1991), the federal court certified a similar issue to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. However, the state court found the statute inapplicable. Kai-
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Even if a plaintiff is not time barred or otherwise precluded
from litigation, he or she has a limited choice of which cause of action to bring. In the United States, unlike Canada and perhaps
Australia, an HIV-infected plaintiff may not sue successfully under
any product liability or implied warranty theory. The plaintiffs
sole remedy-negligence-requires him or her to prove the blood
bank had a duty, that the bank breached that duty, and that the
breach was a proximate cause of his or her infection.14
Duty and Breach of Duty
In order to prove a breach of duty, the plaintiff generally must
proceed on either of two theories. First, the plaintiff may claim the
defendant blood bank was negligent in predonation procedures by
failing to screen the potential donors adequately. Second, the plaintiff may claim the defendant failed to utilize surrogate blood testing. 15 The plaintiffs burden increases significantly when the
jurisdiction follows the standard of professional care rather than
that of the ordinary, reasonable person.
The HIV/AIDS plaintiff should attempt to establish that the
defendant blood bank followed inadequate predonation screening
procedures. Some of the crucial issues for litigation arising from
transfusions between 1981 and March 1985 are: the defendants'
knowledge about HIV/AIDS; when the defendants became aware of
the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission through blood transfusions; and
what the industry could have done to minimize HIV/AIDS transmission.' 6 While generalizations are often difficult to make, it is
ser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn.
1992); see also Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 976 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir.
1992) (certifying a similar question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court). Upon
certification, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a blood bank was not a
health care provider. Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 500 N.W.2d 264, 264-65
(Wis. 1993).
Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991), took this theory
of non-applicability one step further. The Hawaii Supreme Court, looking to a

market share theory, held the statute permitted suits against blood banks even
though the plaintiff could not prove the identity of the actual blood bank
tortfeasor. Id. at 727-29.
The state supreme court may decline to answer a certified question. Coleman v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 483 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992).
14. Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Found., 853 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993).

15. Surrogate blood testing "is used when there is no direct test available to

defect the presence of a disease or the antibody generated by the disease."
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
"Surrogate testing is thus utilized to determine the presence of factors believed
to be statistically linked to the presence of a disease." Id. For further discussion of surrogate testing, see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
16. An excellent chronological summary of the discovery of HIV/AIDS and
the threat of HIV transmission through blood appears in Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 381 (9th Cir. 1992), and in the somewhat outdated analysis in Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-53 (D.D.C.
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more likely that a court will find a defendant's breach of duty if the
transfusion date is closer to 1985. In Hoemke v. New York Blood
Center,x7 for example, the court stated: "Vital to our conclusion are
the particular facts of this case, specifically the year [1981] in which
the transfusion occurred. Had the transfusion occurred even a
short time later, the reasoning and conclusions might well have
been different, given the emerging knowledge of AIDS in the
1980s. "Is As HIV/AIDS awareness increased toward the mid1987), affd in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For an informative
television broadcast, see Frontline:AIDS Blood and Politics (Corp. for Public
Broadcasting television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1993).
17. 912 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1990).
18. Id. at 553-54. The key issue in these case is clearly when the research
and warnings about HIV transmission in blood were available to the defendants. Id. at 552. No one believed in the possibility that the HIV/AIDS was

blood borne until eight months after plaintiffs 1981 operation. Id. In a case

involving a 1982 operation and necessary transfusions, the hospital won on a
summary judgment based on the hospital expert's affidavit that the defendant
met the standards of care at a time when no one used surrogate testing. Jaime,
853 S.W.2d at 614-15. In a later case, a court said the hospital did more than
any other blood bank in order to avoid negligence and that the defendant was a
pioneer in the area of donor's questioning. Osborne v. Irwin Hosp., 7 Cal. Rptr.
2d 101, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). No other blood bank in the nation used surrogate tests at that time. Id. at 123; see also Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517, 518-524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the medical
profession's recognition of the need for surrogate testing in the mid-1980s). In a
case involving a transfusion in September 1983, the plaintiff received a single
vile of koyne and became HIV positive. Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187,
189-90 (4th Cir. 1991). Yet there was still no consensus that HIV/AIDS was
transmissible through blood transfusions until early 1984. Id. No blood bank
utilized donor screening or testing procedures in September 1983. Id. at 191;
see Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to show any violation of standard of care regarding a 1983 transfusion), aff'd, 971 F.2d 744 (1st Cir. 1992); Smythe v. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 797 F. Supp. 147, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting motion for summary
judgment because the defendant complied with professional standard of care by
following FDA regulations and blood bank standards). In Jones v. Miles Lab.,
Inc., 887 F.2d 1576, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989), an individual donated plasma on
January 31, 1983, and February 3, 1983. At the time, it was not the industrywide practice to ask donors about high risk behavior. Id. at 1579. FDA recommendations concerning high risk began March 24, 1983. Id. at 1580. Defendant wrote an internal memo on February 8, 1983, regarding the need to ask
about high risk donors. Id. The court held that the question of negligence
centered around those few days of February 1983. Id. at 1581. The judge
granted a motion for judgment N.O.V. and set aside the jury award of $1.6 million. Id. at 1582. In Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768, 773 (W.D.
Ark. 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989), the blood at issue was inventoried only days before the test kits became available. The court, applying the
professional standard of care, rejected the argument that the bank should have
asked their donors sexually specific question or should have used surrogate
testing. Id. at 773-78.
Thus, most of the cases dealing with tainted transfusions in the early 1980s
resulted in findings for the blood banks because plaintiffs could not establish
violations of the professional standard of care. In McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675
F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (E.D. Ky. 1987), affd sub nom. McKee v. Cutter Lab., Inc.,
886 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989), the defendant pharmaceutical company did not
use alternative testing to identify the HIV virus. However, the court held that
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1980s, blood banks had to take more steps to fulfill their increased
duties with regard to blood product recipients. 19
Discovery is the key factor in determining whether the defendant blood bank either failed to adequately screen prospective donors
who were HIV positive or that the defendant blood bank failed to
utilize surrogate testing which would test for blood abnormalities
often found among high-risk groups. Once informed of their status,
HIV positive transfusion victims sought information from the HIVinfected donor through the blood bank. Plaintiffs' attorneys insisted this was necessary in order to determine Whether the blood
bank followed its own screening procedures in accepting donor
20
blood and whether the screening procedures were adequate.
Blood bank representatives responded: "Where a donor's name has
been revealed, the plaintiffs have jumped at the chance to bring a
21
lawsuit against that individual."
Courts diverge on whether, and to what extent, blood banks
must reveal the donor's information for discovery purposes. Generally, "there is an increased sensitivity to discrimination against
HIV-positive individuals. It is a fair summary that most recent
cases more frequently allow disclosure, and do so under increasingly detailed confidentiality restrictions." 2 2 Courts which have denied discovery, often cite one of three essential propositions: that
the plaintiffs lawyer either -was on a "fishing expedition" 2 3 ; that
public policy necessitated that a donor's fear of publicity must not
jeopardize the "free flow of volunteer blood" 24 ; and that the donor
the defendant did not violate the standard of care within the profession because

the industry did not know that HIV could be transmitted through blood until
1984, and therefore, the industry did not screen or conduct alternative testing
prior to that time. Id. at 1063-64. In Shelby v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No.
CIV.A.H-86-3780, 1988 WL 28996, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1988), the court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the industry's standard of care was care-

less because "no test for the HIV virus was available at the time the blood in
question was transfused."
19. For a good discussion of the chronology and discovery of HIV/AIDS
routes of transmission and testing, see United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827
P.2d 509, 513-16 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
20. John M. Willis, Esq., Donor Identity and Discovery Directed to Donors:
Obtaining Access to Donors of HIV-Infected Blood, Speech at Am. Trial Lawyers Ass'n Convention (Aug. 1, 1992).
21. In the Field... , AIDS POL'Y AND LAW, Oct. 16, 1992, at 6 (remarks of
Cynthia Kelly, AABB General Counsel).
22. Roth v. New York Blood Ctr., Inc., 596 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642-43 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993).
23. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla.
1987). Whether Rasmussen bars all discovery is a question now certified before
the Florida Supreme Court. Whigham v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics,
Inc., 613 So. 2d 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
24. Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
The Krygier court denied discovery citing the need for a "free flow" of donations
and the "marginal utility [served by the disclosure] in advancing plaintiffs theory of liability." Id. The court also noted that the physician/patient privilege

1994

Blood Banks and Manufacturers

has either a state or federal constitutional right to privacy. 25
Most recent decisions allow limited discovery of a donor with
the understanding that none of the parties will sue the donor or
reveal his or her identity. In Roth v. New York Blood Center,2 6 the
court temporarily denied discovery for failure to guarantee complete donor confidentiality, but rejected' the public policy defense of
a chilling effect on the nation's blood supply:
As to the request for an unlimited disclosure of the donor's name, in
the event the donor is alive, with the avowed purpose of deposing the
donor about a broad range of topics, that request is denied. Plaintiff
has not (1) established the relevance of the proposed inquiry sufficient
to show a compelling need for the discovery desired; (2) confined the
scope of the disclosure request, (3) professed a willingness to limit access to the information, or (4) offered an argument in relation to the
impact of any disclosure order on the donor and the policy of encouraging HIV and AIDS testing and treatment. Accordingly,
the request is
27
denied with leave to renew upon proper papers.
In another case alleging negligent screening by the Red Cross, a
court put stringent requirements on discovery which included ordering the plaintiff to pay donor's court-appointed attorney fees
28
while also maintaining the lawyer's confidentiality.
Other courts turn the public policy argument on its head. In
Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center,29 the Court upheld a $1.8 million
verdict against the blood bank and dismissed the public policy argument as bordering on "speculation."30 The court noted: "[T]rue public interest is [in] an uninfected blood supply .

.

. [which] should

applies to blood banks. Id. at 476-77. Courts have also discussed the fear of
jeopardizing blood supplies by frightening donors. E.g., Bradway v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Doe v. American Red Cross
Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 53738. In Ellison v. American National Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 8 (D.N.H. 1993), the
court concluded the need to preserve the nation's blood supply outweighed the
decedent's private interest in obtaining the donor's identity. Id. at 11. The
court rejected plaintiffs argument that "without the ability to contact the donor, it will be virtually impossible for Mr. Ellison to sustain his case." Id.
25. Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 424 (Ohio Ct. App.

1988). The court also noted the donor had a right to privacy plus based on
written assurances of confidentiality. Id. at 425. This plaintiffs interest in
discovery did not outweigh the donor's interest in privacy arising from the federal and state constitutions and the written assurances. Id. This court also
rejected defendant's contention that it should deny discovery because of physician/patient privilege. Id. at 423. Some courts also cite a donor's statutory
right to privacy. See Krygier, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (citing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
3103 (McKinney 1994)).
26. 596 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
27. Id. at 646.
28. Diabo v. Baystate Medical Ctr., No. CIV.A91-10648-F, 1993 WL 379563,
at *1 (D. Mass. Sep. 22, 1993).
29. 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991).
30. Id. at 379.
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discourage donors who are in the high risk groups." 3 1 Other courts
grant discovery requests upon concluding that donors have no constitutional or other privacy rights while "affording the donors protection from undue publicity and intrusion into their private
lives."

32

Besides using stringent donor questionnaires and excluding
high-risk groups, blood banks could minimize HIV-infection by
utilizing surrogate testing. These tests would detect Hepatitis B
and other diseases common to those in high-risk categories. As explained in United Blood Services v. Quintana,33 the test procedure
correctly identifies between sixty-six and eighty-eight percent of all
HIV-infected donors. 3 4 The court wrote: "The tests, however, had a
two to five percent false-positive rate, which would result in a rejection of uninfected blood and would thereby diminish the nation's
blood supply."3 5 In Quintana, after the plaintiff claimed that the
failure to utilize surrogate testing constituted negligence, the defendants necessarily insisted that the above procedure was too un36
reliable, overbroad, and not cost-effective.
Even if plaintiff obtains discovery of an HIV-infected donor or
proves the defendant failed to utilize surrogate testing, he or she
may still face an uphill struggle in order to prove a breach of duty.
Most jurisdictions utilize a professional or industry-wide standard
31. Id. (emphasis in original); see Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974
F.2d 482, 489 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding no evidence to substantiate speculative
claim that limited discovery will jeopardize the nation's blood supply). The
court found that the donor's privacy rights were not violated. Id. at 488. Even
if they were, the plaintiffs rights outweighed the donor's rights. Id. The court

wrote: "At most, the invasion of the donor's privacy is minimal and this interest
is greatly outweighed by the plaintiffs need for the information and the related
public interest in seeking that injuries are compensated." Id. Another court

also rejected the public policy argument that to allow disclosure would hinder
voluntary blood donations. See JOHN PAUL BARBER, AMERICAN ASS'N OF BLOOD
BANKS, DIGEST OF TRANSFusION-AssocIATED H1V/AIDS LITIGATION

22 (Oct. 28,

1992) (citing John Jones v. American Nat'l Red Cross, Civil Action No. 88-4510
(GEB), (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 1989)). A balancing test favors limited discovery even
though it might result in potential donors being less likely to give blood or "conceal important information during the screening process." Borzillieri v. Am.
Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 284, 291 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). Defendants succeeded in
obtaining an order to stay discovery from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. Deborah Pines, Discovery Stayed in AIDS-Tainted Blood
Suit, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 15, 1992, at 1. The case settled on February 13, 1992.
Telephone Interview with Gregory P. Krull, attorney for the plaintiff (Oct. 8,
1993).
32. Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988). Of course, some courts have come to the opposite conclusion on
the issue of the donor's privacy. See Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr. of Hopkins
County, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (holding that a blood donor's identity must be revealed to a limited group of persons).
33. 827 P.2d 509 at 515 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
34. Id. at 515.
35. Id.
36. Cf. id. at 525.
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of care rather than the standard of the ordinary, reasonable person. 37 In Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, the court applied a
professional standard of care and noted that the majority of courts
38
followed this rule of law.
When the courts utilize the professional standard, expert testimony is necessary in order to prove a departure from the professional standard. Courts may require a plaintiff to find an expert
witness certified not merely in internal medicine, but "rather ...
[one] in blood banking."3 9 Thus, the plaintiff failed to comply with
"the general rule in medical malpractice cases ...that expert medi-

40
cal testimony is required to establish proper medical procedure."
A plaintiff who became HIV positive from a 1988 transfusion, therefore, had no case against Red Cross because he could not show that
Red Cross actions "were not in accordance with those of similarly
41
situated blood collectors at the time of the challenged actions."
Thus, until 1985, defendants could successfully assert that it was
not a generally accepted blood bank practice either to screen very
42
carefully prospective donors or to utilize surrogate testing.

The vast majority of cases result in decisions for the defendants, often after a determination that the defendants met the standard of care at the time of the transfusion. In one such case, Gibson
v. Methodist Hospital,4 3 the Texas Supreme Court at first concluded that defendant might have violated the applicable standard
of care based on the proffered testimony of plaintiffs expert who
held "a Ph.D. in environmental health" from a correspondence
school. 44 On December 16, 1992, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its opinion and denied plaintiffs writ which resulted in dis37. Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standardof Care, 49 Law
and Contemp. Probs. 265, 266-67 (1986). "[Aldherence to prevalent professional
standards creates an almost irrebuttable presumption of due care." Id. at 267.
38. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Theodore Silver,
One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The HistoricalJurisprudenceof Medical
Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1216-19); see, e.g., Smith v. Paslode Corp.,
799 F. Supp. 960, 972 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (granting the Red Cross' motion for summary judgment based on the professional standard of care because evidence
showed that the "blood banking profession almost uniformly did not use surrogate testing as a marker for HIV or AIDS"), modified, 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir.
1993).
39. Barton v. American Red Cross, 829 F. Supp. 1290, 1300 (M.D. Ala.
1993).
40. Id. at 1302,
41. Id. at 1297.
42. Kelly & Barber, supra note 1, at 819.
43. No. D-2057, 1992 WL 140842 (Tex. June 24, 1992), withdrawn on reh'g
(Dec. 16, 1992).
44. Texas Reverses Position on Hospital Liability for Blood Bank Actions,
Blood Bank Wk., Jan. 15, 1993, at 5; Respondents' Motion for Rehearing on
Application for Writ of Error at 13, Gibson, No. D-2057, 1992 WL 140842.
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missal of plaintiffs lawsuit.4 5
There have, of course, been some cases where plaintiffs were
successful. Generally, this is because a defendant neither utilized
surrogate testing,4 6 nor aggressively questioned prospective donors. 47 These defendants generally failed to follow AABB recommendations. 48 The court may have also adopted the reasonable
49
person standard.
Often, however, a jury award becomes at best a pyrrhic victory.
Conider the following three cases. In Brown v. United Blood Services, 50 the estate of an H1V positive plaintiff received a jury award
of $970,000. 5 1 Prior to that determination, the case went to the
Nevada Supreme Court which had placed stringent limits concerning the discovery procedure regarding the HIV positive donor. In
post-trial motions, the trial judge reduced the award to $135,400.52
On subsequent appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court joined "the clear
and growing consensus of jurisdictions" by concluding that the defendant had satisfied the professional standard of care which left
53
the estate without any recovery.
In United Blood Services v. Quintana,5 4 the plaintiff tested
HIV positive in November 1985 as a result of a May 1983 transfusion. In 1989, after a four-week jury trial, the trial judge instructed
the jury that the defendant would not be negligent if it followed the
professional standard of care. 5 5 The appellate and supreme courts
45. Texas Reverses Position on Hospital Liability for Blood Bank Actions,
supra note 44, at 5.

46. United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo. 1992). In
Quintana, defendant's screening procedures "did not include the aggressive

questioning and physical examination of blood donors as recommended by the
National Hemophilia Foundation." Id. at 517.

47. Crandall v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 581 So. 2d 593, 595
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant because they were negligent in screening
blood donors. Id. Plaintiffs expert witness believed the defendant should have

required the donors to disclose whether they had a recent medical history of
"fever, skin eruption, aching joints and muscles, weakness, lymph gland enlargement, sore throat, gastrointestinal symptoms, headache, or sensitivity to
light." Id. at 595.
48. In J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. v. Beeson, 835 S.W.2d 689
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992), the surviving spouse and son of a recipient who contracted
HIV/AIDS after an April 1983 transfusion received $800,000 from a jury. Id. at

692. The defendant did not follow AABB and Centers for Disease Control recommendations. Id. at 699-700. In addition, the court held that blood banks do
not provide health care and, thus, could not assert the shorter health care Statute of Limitations. Id. at 696.
49. Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990),
affd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
50. 858 P.2d 391, 396 (Nev. 1993).
51. Id. at 393.

52. Id. at 393.
53. Id. at 396.
54. 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992).

55. Id. at 511-13.
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disagreed and stated that adhesion to professional standards was
only a rebuttable presumption of due care. 56 This necessitated a
new trial, and in November 1992, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$8.15 million (approximately $16 million with interest).5 7 Unfortunately, the plaintiff died prior to the verdict. 58 Understandably,
the defendant appealed and the
case eventually settled for an un59
disclosed amount in late 1993.

In Walls v. Armour PharmaceuticalCorp.,60 the plaintiff child
contracted HIV from a blood clotting manufacturer sometime between 1983 and 1985.61 In 1989 he sued Armour, but died in
1992.62 On January 22, 1993, a jury awarded his subsequently divorced parents $2 million. 63 On July 19, 1993, the federal court
denied defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 64 On

September 1, 1993, the court denied the defendant's motion for a
new trial.6 5 It was devastating for the parties that his case was not
final ten years after the date he may have been infected.
Perhaps the delay and cost of litigation will be minimized by
following the result of class action hemophiliac suits against the
major blood plasma corporations and by a judicial willingness to
accept market share or alternative theories of liability. Although
the plaintiff cannot prove which defendant caused the injury, a federal judge has permitted the plaintiff to proceed with his case based
on an alternative theory of liability.6 6 Under the alternative liabil56. Id. at 521.
57. Transfusions:Award of 8.15 Million Upheld in Colorado Tainted Blood
Suit, AIDS Pol'y and L., Nov. 13, 1992, at 2.
58. Id. The Quintana court received expert testimony from Don Francis,
M.D., whom Randy Shilts claims was the first to identify the HLV danger to the
blood supply in his book. AND THE BAND PLAYED ON. Alexander Peters, Good
Enough for HBO, but not for the Witness Box, THE RECORDER, Jan. 20, 1993, at
2. Interestingly, a California court would not allow Dr. Francis to testify as an
expert witness against Irwin Memorial Hospital because his expertise was in
hepatitis and not blood banking. Id.
59. Telephone Interview with Kay Johnson, paralegal at Lewis and Roca,
Phoenix, Arizona, attorneys for United Blood Services (Mar. 10, 1994). The
court vacated the award on October 28, 1993. Id.
60. 832 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
61. Id. at 1469.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1504.
65. Walls v. Armour Pharmaceutical Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1505 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
66. Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
The United States District Court stated:
[We adopt the market-share alternate theory of liability as formulated by
the Washington Supreme Court. However, as a prerequisite to its use, a
plaintiff must make a showing that she has made a genuine attempt to
locate and to identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury. We further restrict this vehicle of recovery to those actions sounding in negligence; it may not be used in conjunction with allegations of fraud, breach of
warranty or strict liability.
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ity theory, if a plaintiff proves that several defendants acted negligently, but cannot prove which defendant in fact caused his injury,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to prove that they did
not cause the injury. 6 7 This allows relief even though plaintiffs
cannot prove which manufacturer of clotting products made the
contaminated Factor VIII clotting product that caused the injury. 68
Plaintiffs may also base their claims on market share liability.
This is possible when the plaintiffs can establish an inherent inability to determine which manufacturer was responsible for their injuries. 69 The plaintiff must show the court that they made a "genuine
attempt to locate and to identify the manufacturer." 70 The percentage of market share held by each defendant determines the extent
to which they are liable for the plaintiffs recovery. 7 1 The market
share theory applies only in negligence; it is inapplicable in cases
72
involving fraud, breach of warranty, or strict liability.
In Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., the court concluded: "[A] hemophiliac plaintiff does not necessarily have to prove which of the
four major manufacturers made the so-called Factor VIII clotting
product." 73 Although one plaintiff could not specify which company
manufactured the contaminated product, the court allowed the case
to proceed based on the allegation that the four manufacturers
knew of potential viruses in the clotting product and should have
74
purified it.
Waldleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc., a class action suit presently awaiting certification filed against four blood product makers
and the National Hemophilia Foundation, illustrates the alternative liability theory applied in HIV transfusion cases. 7 5 The plainId.
67. Ray v. Cutter Laboratories,a federal district court in Florida explicitly
allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on their theory of market share liability, provided they could establish an inherent inability to determine which manufacturer was responsible for their injury. Id. at 196.
Id. Practitioners should also note Poole is one of the few cases where the
court sanctioned plaintiff attorneys for including one frivolous cause of action in
their multi-count complaint. Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp.
1367, 1374 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
68. Ray v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 193, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
69. Id.
70. Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1992).
71. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196.
72. See Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d at 378 (applying Hawaiian
law). Adherence to industry practices was not dispositive on the issue of negligence. Id. at 382-83. The court proceeded under the theory of market share
liability. Id. at 380.
73. 971 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining the difference between the
alternative liability, enterprise liability and market share liability theories).
74. Id.
75. Complaint, No. 93 C 5969, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1993); PROD. SAFETY &
LWma. REP., Oct. 8, 1993, at 1013; see Laura Duncan, "AlternativeLiability" Theory Opens Court Doors to HIV-Hemophiliacs, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 21,
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tiffs alleged that by 1982 the companies had become aware of the
risks of HIV and blood contamination, but failed either to warn
hemophiliacs of the risk or to withdraw the products from the market. 76 The complaint also alleged that the hemophiliac foundation

breached its fiduciary duty to provide medical information to its
plaintiff members, and had circulated incorrect information that
77
the risk of using Factor VIII was minimal.
It is also possible that up to 8,000 lawsuits by HIV positive
hemophiliacs will form a class action. 78 In In re Factor VIII or IX
Concentrate Blood Products,ProductsLiability Litigation,plaintiffs
allege that the defendants' failure to warn, negligent manufacturing of medication between 1980 and 1985, negligent failure to recall
products, and fraudulent misrepresentation resulted in plaintiffs
contracting HIV.79 In their brief, the plaintiffs succinctly argue:
[S]everal former government employees and scientists are now willing
to testify regarding the facts surrounding [factor concentrates] and
AIDS but they have specifically
stated they do not wish to testify more
80

than a couple of times.
In addition, some plaintiffs have accumulated 'tens of thousands' of
pages of documents, many of them technical and complex, that need
81
to be analyzed, computerized, and centralized.
Notwithstanding class action litigation by hemophiliacs, plaintiffs who contracted HIV/AIDS from blood or blood products have no
choice but to engage in costly and time consuming litigation. Unlike similarly-situated complainants in Canada, Great Britain and
some Australian states, there is no choice between litigation and
the acceptance of governmental compensation.
II.

CANADA

On September 15, 1993, the Canadian provincial governments
diverged from the United States view when they offered HIV/AIDS
blood/blood product victims a compensation scheme. 8 2 Claimants
1993, at 1 (discussing the alternative liability theory in contaminated blood
cases).
76. Id.
77. Id. A federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois has also been
assigned to preside over multi-district litigation throughout the country for purposes of discovery. Id.
78. AIDS: Blood Factor Cases Should Be Consolidated in FloridaFederal
Court, MDL Petition Says, 21 PROD. SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 776, 776 (1993)
[hereinafter Blood Factor Cases].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Tanya Willmer, Canada Offers More Cash for Some HIV-Infected
People, REUTER LIB. REP., Dec. 1, 1993 (reporting on recent action by most of
Canada's provincial governments to provide compensation for individuals who
contracted HIV from infected blood products).
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had until March 15, 1994, to accept the offer. By March 19, 1994,
826 of the 910 eligible victims filed for government compensation.
Canada, unlike the United States, neither permits the sale of
blood nor shields the identity of blood donors. Moreover, provincial
governments have created a compensatory scheme for HIV/AIDS
transfusion victims. 8 3 Presently, there are about 120 lawsuits
against provincial governments and the Canadian Red Cross. The
compensation offer is the conclusion of a major effort by the provincial governments, the Canadian Red Cross and insurance companies.
From the total fund of $151 million (Canadian), the
approximately 1,000 infected individuals would receive an immediate payment of $22,000 and an annual lifetime payment of $30,000.
Spouses and children of spouses would receive lesser payments for
84
a period of five years.
Almost all litigation came to a standstill while plaintiffs considered whether to accept the offer.8 5 Plaintiffs would have preferred
to wait until they receive the results of a judicial inquiry begun in
November 1993 into the Canadian blood system.8 6 The inquiry will
not be complete until-at the earliest-the end of 1994.87 Should a
victim accept the compensation, he must sign a waiver which would
preclude any future litigation against either the government, the
Red Cross, pharmaceutical companies or hospitals.
Two cases will apparently be unaffected by the provincial offers. In December 1993, a group of plaintiffs filed a class action suit
against the Ontario Provincial Government and the Canadian Red
Cross, which the court rejected because the claims "are highly individual in nature."88 The plaintiffs' attorney insists that "for a large
number of those affected, the compensation is both unfair and seriously inadequate, while the government's requirement that all af83. Id.

84. Id.
85. See Andre Picard, Terms of Deal Over Blood Draw Protests, GLOBE &
MAIL, Dec. 7, 1993, at A5 (discussing the public's disapproval of the govern-

ment's compensation offer which requires HIV/AIDS victims to waive their
right to bring legal action before the disclosure of judicial inquiry results).
Nova Scotia only requires the release of the government from liability. The
Law Society of Upper Canada has strongly suggested extreme caution in advising settlement. Press Release from The Law Society of Upper Canada, Feb. 28,

1994.
86. Id.
87. Id. Justice Horace Krever, head of the Commission of

Inquiry on the
Blood System in Canada, believes it will take almost two years to report the
Commission's findings. Tanya Willmer, Canada Starts Inquiry Into Tainted
Blood Scandal, REUTER LIB. REP., Feb. 14, 1994. A good summary of the Krever
inquiry in Toronto last March appears in Warren Gerard, Ending the Silence of
Tainted Blood, Toronto Star, Mar. 19, 1994, at B1.
88. Barry Brown, OntarioJudge Disallows Joint Lawsuit by 732 Who Got
HIV Via Tainted Blood, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 21, 1994, at A5. Plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal on February 24, 1994.
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fected people accept the package and sign a release-before all
relevant information is available-is unconscionable."8 9 In the
other case, Estate of Pittman v. Bain, the decedent contracted HIV
in 1984 from a blood transfusion. 90 Although the physician learned
the blood donor's HIV status in 1989, he may not have informed
Pittman "because it might further upset his health and because he
didn't think the couple were having sexual relations."9 1 Unfortunately, Pittman, who Bain thought was impotent, continued to have
sexual relations with his wife who also became HIV positive. 9 2 In
March 1994, the trial judge awarded the plaintiffs at least
$515,000-subject to calculation of Mrs. Bain's lost income and fu93
ture medical expenses.
In Canada, unlike the United States, it is common practice to
sue the Canadian Red Cross and other defendants for breach of its
warranty of fitness implied by the common law or by a provincial
Sale of Goods Act. 94 Litigants may also sue in negligence, alleging
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and that the defendant failed to
screen, warn, or test. The plaintiffs may even claim the defendant
was negligent in using blood from the United States since it "was
less reliable and [less] protected from contamination than that of
Canada in that the blood was bought from individuals creating a
higher risk that blood would be obtained from persons with a higher
than normal likelihood of HIV infection."9 5
The seminal Canadian case establishing a plaintiff's liberal access to discovery concerning the blood donor is Sharpe Estate v.
Northwestern General Hospital.96 The plaintiff sued, inter alia, the
Canadian Red Cross as a third-party defendant. In Sharpe, the
plaintiff sought to compel the Red Cross to answer a series of questions which would require the Red Cross to produce a detailed list
of blood and blood products supplied to the defendant hospital and
89. HIV Class Action Launched to Serve People Affected by Tainted Blood
Supply, CANADA NEWSWiRE, Dec. 8, 1993.
90. For a discussion of Pittman, see D'Arcy Jenish & Diane Brady, Lethal
Blood; A Formal Search Begins for AIDS Virus Carriers,MACLEAN's, May 3,

1993, at 40. See also Brad Evenson, Bad Blood's Deadly Legacy, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 11, 1993, at B1 (discussing the poor judgment of Pittman's physician
in failing to tell his patient of his possible HIV diagnosis).
91. Evenson, supra note 90, at B1; see also Wendy Darroch, H1V Trial
Hears Final Arguments, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 1994, at A24 (discussing
Pittman).
92. Id. Pittman died from AIDS related pneumonia in 1990.
93. Pittman v. Bain, No. 21488/91U, slip op. at 311 (Ontario Ct. of Justice,
Gen. Div., Mar. 14, 1994). Madam Justice Susan E. Lang found the doctor was
responsible for forty percent of the plaintiff's injury. Id. The blood bank and
the hospital were each liable for twenty percent. Id.
94. E.g., Sales of Goods Act, R.S.O., ch. 462 (1980) (Ont.).
95. Plaintiff's Complaint at 10, Gardner v. Canadian Red Cross, No. 163693 (Ont. filed July 13, 1992).
96. 74 D.L.R. (4th) 43 (1990).
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to produce a list identifying the donors from whom the blood or
blood products could have come. The parties stipulated that there
were about 1,250 donors from whom the blood and blood products
originated. The Red Cross objected on two primary grounds: public
policy arising from the need to protect the confidentiality of the donor and the claim of documentary privilege 97 ; and the high degree
of inconvenience and expense to the Red Cross if the court ordered
it to answer the questions. 98 Each side relied primarily on United
States donor discovery cases. 99 On appeal, the Canadian High
Court affirmed the master's requirement that plaintiff have his discovery and ignored United States cases, relying instead upon the
Canadian Supreme Court case of Slavutych v. Baker.'0 0 In
Slavutych, 10 1 the Court placed a heavy burden on the party claiming privilege by requiring that it show "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications [is]
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
10 2
litigation."
As a result of the Sharpe decision which essentially opened the
door for disclosure of donor information, plaintiffs' attorneys and
the Red Cross have agreed that the Red Cross and other defendants
will pay the donor's attorneys fees. The donor's attorney will also
accept service of process. The donor, if physically able, will testify
at trial or at a video deposition. Often, a designated judge who has
expertise in the matter will preside. The identity of the donor is
confidential and the neither the parties nor the media may disclose
10 3
his or her name.
Gardner v. Canadian Red Cross10 4 presents a typical case,
97. Id. at 47.
98. The Red Cross estimated it would take one employee six months to complete the task. Id. at 58.

99. For example, the Canadian Red Cross relied on Rasmussen v. South

Florida Blood Servs., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987), which held that disclosure

of donor information would be contrary to the public interest of encouraging

people to donate blood. Sharpe, 74 D.L.R. (4th) at 48. The plaintiff pointed to
Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988), where a court ordered the defendant to disclose to the plaintiffs attorney

certain information regarding the donor of the HIV tainted blood. Sharpe, 76
D.L.R. (4th) at 54.
100. Sharpe v. Northwestern Gen. Hosp., 76 D.L.R. (4th) 535 (1991) (affirming the lower court).
101. 55 D.L.R.(3d) 224 (1975).

102. Id. (citing 8

WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE

2285 (1961)) (emphasis in

original).
The case settled out of court with all parties agreeing to say only that
Sharpe is no longer before the courts.
103. See supra note 90, and accompanying text (discussing the Pittman
court's efforts to protect the ill donor's privacy and accommodate his circumstances). In Pittman, the judge actually went to the hospital of the terminallyill donor and conducted an evidentiary hearing.
104. No. 1636-93 (Ont. filed July 13, 1992).
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brought by minor HIV positive plaintiffs through their guardians.
The complaint names ten defendants and claims general and nonpecuniary damages of $3 million and pecuniary damages of $2 million arising from their contraction of HIV/AIDS through blood
transfusions.10 5 The parents, in their own names, claim $250,000
in damages pursuant to the Family Law Act. The ten defendants
include the Red Cross, drug-blood product manufacturers and distributors, as well as the physicians and hospitals involved. The
plaintiffs allege that since 1982, the defendants knew, or should
have known, of the risk of HIV via blood transmission and should
have used testing to identify high-risk donors and isolate the infected blood. The defendants also allegedly failed to warn plaintiffs
of the risks of HIV contamination and to afford plaintiffs an informed choice as to alternative methods of treatment. The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the defendants took inadequate steps:
a. to warn... of the risks they faced of HIV and AIDS from contaminated Factor VIII;
c. to screen.., potential donors and donated blood for those who had
a high risk of carrying the HIV;
d. to test ... blood supplies "in stock" and blood collected ... from
donors for the presence of indicators of a high risk of HIV in the
blood;
e. to treat.., blood supplies "in stock" and blood collected... from
donors to destroy the HIV;
h.

to institute ... heat treatment of blood products early enough to
prevent ... infection;

k. to avoid the importation of blood, blood products or concentrated
10 6
Factor VIII from the United States.
Undoubtably, the verdict in Pittman may have had an impact
on whether a claimant accepted the government's offer by March
15, 1994. At the very least, however, the HIV infected claimants
had a choice as to whether to accept the alternative to time consuming litigation.
III.

GREAT BRITAIN

While the Act of Union of 1707 created Great Britain, there are
still significant differences between the English and the Scottish
legal systems. For example, while the Secretary of State may play
a major role in Scottish litigation, he has no similar counterpart in
105. Plaintiffs Complaint para. 1, 16, Gardner v. Canadian Red Cross, No.
1636-93.
106. Plaintiffs Complaint para. 16, 17, Gardner v. Canadian Red Cross, No.
1636-93.
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English law. In England, government offers made to hemophiliacs
(and reluctantly to those contracting HIV from transfusions) have
led to acceptance by virtually all claimants. This has resulted in
the near cessation of litigation. In the Republic of Ireland, the government has compensated HIV/AIDS transfusion victims, but left
the door open to further litigation against blood product manufacturers who supplied government health authorities with infected
blood products.
Within Great Britain, the most significant case has been Re
HlVHaemophiliacLitigation.'0 7 This case involves over 900 plaintiffs, the majority of whom are hemophiliacs who contracted HIV
through American Factor VIII blood products from commercial
sources. Many of the plaintiffs are wives and children of the victims, some of whom are already deceased. In total, this case has
involved 70 solicitors and 220 defendants. The crucial issues were
whether the court would permit the disclosure of approximately 600
documents over claims of public immunity and whether the Department of Health and other defendants breached a duty owed plaintiffs. The complaint stated that the defendants went beyond mere
negligence when they relied upon the United States blood supply.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants: (1) breached a duty
by not achieving self-sufficiency in blood and therefore relying on
the United States for HIV infected Factor VIII, especially since the
United States allowed paid donors to contribute blood; (2) breached
a duty by failing to exclude or screen donors, and (3) breached a
duty by failing to use adequate heat treatment.' 0 8 The Court of
Appeal concluded the plaintiffs had "a good arguable" common law
negligence claim.
Lord Justice Gibson wrote: "The task of the court is properly
to balance the public interest in preserving the immunity on the
one hand, and the public interest in the fair trial of the proceedings
on the other. It has been said that the test is intended to be fairly
strict."10 9 Among the documents which Judge Gibson ordered
disclosed were reports of Government ministers and officials
concerning:
1(a)(i) Whether to adopt a policy of self sufficiency in blood products;
1(b)(ii)

What warnings to issue to blood donors in order to discourage
those at risk from giving blood . .

1(b)(iii)

How best to implement a procedure for the screening of blood
donations;

107. Re HaemophiliacLitigation, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Sept. 20,
1990, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 2, 1990, at 8.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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1(b)(iv) Whether, when and how to introduce the use of heat treated
blood products;
1(b)(v) What steps to take to minimise
the risk of hepatitis infection
110
to haemophiliacs and others.
Once the court granted most of the plaintiffs' discovery requests,
there developed a tremendous pressure to settle. On remand, Mr.
Justice Ognall, in pressing settlement, suggested the case had an
ethical component which made it distinguishable and "increasingly
notorious" 1 l ' and necessitated the raising of "political considerations rather than purely legal ones." 1 2 He wrote: "It is rare that I
take an initiative of this kind in civil litigation before me, but the
circumstances of these actions are such that I have no hesitation in
doing so, and in much more specific terms than might normally be
13
expected or considered appropriate.""
By November, the government agreed to pay millions of pounds
in compensation to claimants with individual figures ranging from
£21,500 for an infected child to £60,500 for a married hemophiliac
with at least one dependent child. 114 The government also agreed
to make small payments to HIV infected sexual partners of
hemophiliacs and to surviving spouses. 115 Later, the government
awarded over £12 million to non-hemophiliacs who became HIV
positive through transfusions or tissue transfers."16 Given the government's decision thirty days earlier to extend compensation only
to HIV infected hemophiliacs, many viewed this abrupt change of
1 17
position as a "U-turn" for political purposes.
This new government compensation drastically reduced, but
did not entirely eliminate litigation. In 1992, for example, a twelveyear-old hemophiliac sued the Birmingham Central District Health
Authority, alleging: "The sellers of blood in the U.S. included a substantial proportion of drug abusers and homosexuals-the sort of
people who were more prone to hepatitis B, a known risk in the
1970s, and to Aids [sic] when the epidemic struck at the end of the
110. Id.
111. Thomas Prentice, Judge's Pressure Over HIV Victims, THE TIMES
(London), Oct. 1, 1990, at 1D.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Francis Gibb, Haemophiliac AIDS Children to Share £1.5m, THE
TIMES (London), May 10, 1991, at 6A (discussing the government's compensation offer). This amount was in addition to the £20,000 paid one year earlier to
each infected hemophiliac. Id.
115. Id.
116. Robin Oakley, Pounds for HIV Blood Victims, THE TIMES (London), Feb.
17, 1992, at 16H.
117. See Clare Dyer, Change of Heart on HIV Blood Victims; NonHaemophiliacs With AIDS Virus to Get Compensation, GUARDIAN, Feb. 17,
1992, at 3. As Margaret Jay, Director of the National AIDS Trust explained:
"One has to be skeptical about the timing. Nothing has changed in the situation except the need to clear the decks before the next election." Id.
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seventies. These simple truths ought to have been known to the
health authority.""l8 After three days, the trial, which many expected to last several weeks, ended when the High Court approved
a £75,000 settlement. 119
In late 1993, a widow obtained legal aid in order to sue both the
South Birmingham Health Authority which prescribed the drug
AZT to her husband, a hemophiliac who contracted HIV/AIDS from
infected blood products. 120 Susan Threakall claims that her deceased husband displayed no symptoms prior to taking the AZT in
its prescribed doses. 12 1 She alleges that her husband's condition
deteriorated rapidly as a result of the medication. 12 2 Although
Threakall initially received legal aid to sue the South Birmingham
Health Authority, she recently obtained public funding to bring suit
123
against the AZT manufacturer, Wellcome, as well.
Three other plaintiffs who contracted HIV through blood transfusions are also seeking damages based on negligence. These plaintiffs named as defendants the Health Authority and the donor of
the infected blood. Plaintiffs have sought to obtain the name of the
donor and other confidential medical information from the Health
1 24
Authority.

118. Boy of 12 Sues Over HIV Contamination, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 22,
1992.
119. See HIV Boy Settles for £75,000, PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE, Oct. 24, 1992
(discussing the twelve-year-old's settlement with the Birmingham Central District Health Authority).
120. Peter Pallot, Widow Wins Cash for AIDS Drug Fight,DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 31, 1993, at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Press Release from J. Keith Park & Co., Liverpool, Eng., Jan. 11,

1994 (announcing the decision of the Legal Aid Board of England to assist Mrs.
Threakall in her suit against Wellcome). Threakall has also named as a defendant the National Institute of Allergic and Infectious Diseases, the United States
agency that tested and promoted the drug. Neville Hodgkinson, Court Battles
Launched Over Anti-AIDS Drug, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 1994.
124. The Independent, Feb. 14, 1993 at 4. Re HIV HaemophiliacLitigation

did not discuss the issue of donor discovery. That topic is discussed in Andrew

Grubb & David Pearl, Discoveringthe Identity of a Blood Donor, NEW L.J., June

28, 1991, at 897 and July 5, 1991, at 938. The authors strongly argue:
There is a strong (perhaps, literally, a vital) public interest in maintaining
an adequate blood supply. This underlying public interest, in itself, justifies maintaining the confidentiality of blood donors' records and identity.
We are persuaded'by this argument and it has been accepted in principle in
a number of American cases to justify total non-disclosure.
Id. at 899. The authors further conclude that those United States cases that
allow limited donor discovery have "elaborate discovery orders and even if an
English court were to adopt them, which we doubt, ultimately the interests that
compete with the plaintiffs need for discovery are not given proper weight.

Only acceptance of public interest immunity will achieve this." Id. at 938.
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IV.

SCOTLAND

In AB v. Glasgow and West of Scotland Blood Transfusion Ser-

vice, 125 the plaintiff alleged that, in 1986, he received a tainted
blood transfusion administered by the defendant. As a result, he
contracted HIV/AIDS. He sought a court order requiring the transfusion service to disclose the name and address of the donor. The
plaintiff sought this court order only:
[T]o enable him to raise an action of damages against the donor, on the
ground the he negligently failed to disclose to the [blood bank] his high
risk of HIV infection, negligently failed to complete accurately a health
questionnaire which donors are asked to complete, and negligently
donated blood 1for
2 6 transfusion knowing that there was a high risk of it

being infected.

The plaintiff also sued the blood bank for its allegedly inadequate
12 7
screening procedures.

Not only did the defendant blood transfusion service oppose the

plaintiffs request, but the Secretary of State for Scotland vigorously intervened "as [a representative of] the public interest by vir-

tue of his responsibility under the National Health Service
(Scotland) Act [of] 1978 to maintain and promote that service."' 2 8
The Secretary insisted that disclosure should be prohibited "on the
ground of public policy in order to ensure that there is and continues to be a sufficient supply of donor blood to the health service
nationally."' 2 9 According to the Secretary, the nation required the
supply for "necessary and often emergency medical procedures in
the treatment of illness ... ."130 Furthermore, he argued disclosure
would discourage prospective donors. Donors would stop giving
blood out of fear that they might be open to a lawsuit "on the basis
of some adverse effect resulting from the use of the blood for transfusion purposes."131 Lord Justice Morison questioned:
Why [would] such persons... be deterred from pursuing these motives
by an apprehension that they might be unjustifiably sued[?] If on the
other hand there are any persons who give blood without due regard to
their responsibilities,the public interest would plainly be served if they
were discouragedfrom doing so. But as was conceded on behalf of the

petitioner that I was not entitled to investigate the validity of the conclusion expressed by the Secretary of State unless it appeared that the
conclusion was patently unreasonable or had been expressed on an er32
roneous basis, and this obviously cannot be said in the present case. 1
125. ScOrs L. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at 36.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.

130. ScoTs L. TIMES, supra note 125, at 37.
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
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Lord Justice Morison reiterated Scottish law which precludes a
Scottish court from using its inherent power to override the objection of a government minister "upon the basis of an assessment of
the merits of the objection." 13 3 Thus the court concluded that infringement of donor anonymity would place the Scottish blood supply at risk. A plaintiff's right to seek damages should be
subordinate to "a material risk to the sufficiency of the national
supply of blood for purposes of transfusion." 13 4 Lord Justice Morison clearly had reservations about his decision when he wrote:
[I]t is offensive to any notion ofjustice that persons should be deprived
of the ability to claim damages from those by whose negligence they
have been injured. If public policy requires this, it seems to me that it
would be reasonable for pubic
policy to provide also some alternative
35
means of compensation. 1

But for the Secretary of State's intervention, he would have required disclosure:
The court's approach to [the blood transfusion service's] objection
would be different from that which applies to a ministerial objection
based on the public interest. In particular, it would in my opinion be
legitimate for the court to consider and assess the merits of the respondents' objection in light of the nature of the work which they perform,
so as to determine whether or not the petitioner's interest should prevail over that objection. This would involve consideration of the quality of the evidence upon which the respondents rely, and it might also
involve a determination whether there own procedures are adequate to
support the immunity which they say ought to be accorded to
donors. 136

Technically, the above case is still before the courts, but it has
been stayed to enable the plaintiff to obtain further expert medical
advice. In fact, the plaintiff has applied for compensation under
the government scheme and many believe that once the plaintiff
receives compensation, the above action will be formally
l3 7
terminated.
V.

IRELAND

Approximately half of the hemophiliacs in Ireland, who are
HIV positive, have sued the Irish government which was responsible for the distribution of Factor VIII. 3 8 The government awarded

each claimant approximately 80,000-100,000 L.I.R. which was sig133. Id.
134. Id.
135. ScoTs L. TIMES, supra note 125, at 37.
136. Id. at 38.
137. Interview with Lord Abernethy, Judge of Court of Sessions, Scotland
(formerly Alistair Cameron, Q.C., attorney for the blood bank in AB v. Glasgow
and West of Scotland Blood Transfusion Serv.), in New Orleans, LA (Oct. 11,
1993).
138. Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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nificantly higher than the British settlement. Approximately
eighty plaintiffs also decided to sue the three American companies
that produced the HIV tainted Factor VIII blood clotting products. 1 3 9 The defendant corporations removed the cases to federal
court. The judge in Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div. decided that
New York was not the most convenient forum. 140 The court applied
the principles of forum non conveniens and concluded that plaintiffs
should litigate in Ireland, and if for any reason they were unable to
sue in Ireland, the federal court would again consider accepting jurisdiction. 14 1 Contrary to the wishes of the plaintiffs, the High
Court in the Republic of Ireland accepted jurisdiction and concluded
that fifty-four plaintiffs could obtain justice in Ireland. 14 2 The
plaintiffs previously hoped either that Ireland would decline jurisdiction or that Ireland would exercise jurisdiction and apply American law. The Supreme Court of Ireland affirmed the High Court on
March 9, 1994.143 One problem for litigants in the Republic of Ireland is that Ireland does not accept alternate share or market share
liability. Additionally, there are significant discovery problems because Ireland does not allow the taking of depositions. 144 Furthermore, Ireland does not recognize a cause of action for pain and
suffering on behalf of the decedent's estate.

VI. AUSTRALIA
Unlike the United States, all Australian states, except New
South Wales, have settled claims for those infected with HIV
tainted blood. Similar to decisions in Great Britain and perhaps
Canada, the overwhelming majority of Australian cases have been
settled. This is a clear preference for the lower cost of settlement
over the high cost of legal services. Whether new Australian legislation will permit strict liability claims is uncertain. This may result in costly, time consuming, and unpredictable lawsuits.
In a major case on blood bank liability, E v. Australian Red
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1125.
141. See Group Seeks US Hearingsfor HIV Actions,

1993, at 2; Drug Firms Fight Transfer of Case, IRISH

IRISH TIMES, July 30,
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at 2;

Court Told HIV Cases Should Be Tried Here, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at 2;
Haemophiliacs Fail to Have Case Against Firms Heard in U.S., IRISH TIMES,

Aug. 28, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter HaemophiliacsFail].

According to the federal decision in the United States, the defendants, with
the approval of the Irish court, had to waive the Statute of Limitations, accept
service of process, and allow discovery within the bounds of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Doe, 807 F. Supp. at 1133.
142. HaemophiliacsFail,supra note 141.
143. Irish Court to Deal with Haemophiliacs' Claims, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 9,
1994, at 4.
144. Doe, 807 F. Supp. at 1123.
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Cross Society, 145 the court rejected the expedited claim of "E"
against the above three defendants. 146 "E" had an operation in October 1984, eleven days after the tainted blood donation. In essence, the plaintiff argued that the blood bank's screening of the
donor was inadequate and that the blood bank should have utilized
surrogate testing. Both sides presented expert witnesses from the
14 7
United States and cited American publications as authority.
The plaintiff also argued that the Trade Practices Act 148 enabled
him to sue for breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose.
Both the trial court and the full federal court examined the detailed questionnaire requesting that donors who were at risk not
give blood and concluded that, whatever inadequacies this form
might have had, the use of the form would not constitute negligence. 149 Both courts also concluded that under all the circumstances it was not mandatory for the Red Cross to introduce
surrogate testing. The Federal Court of Australia held:
There was no reported Australian blood transfusion AIDS case until
... July 1984. In contrast to the United States, where haemophiliac
AIDS cases emerged at the very beginning of the epidemic, there was
no reported Australian haemophiliac AIDS case until the end of 1984.
I do not think that these differences sufficiently explain the failure of
the Australian authorities even to investigate the possibility of surrogate testing. But, in determining what decision about anti-HBc testing
ought to have been made, if the issue had been discussed, it is relevant
to remember that there was then a mood of optimism about the extent
of the problem in this country. As late as December 1984, a publication of the AIDS Task Force quoted the risk of contracting AIDS
through blood transfusion at about one in 100,000.150
The court also dismissed the implied warranty allegations. It noted
that blood banks "do not actually conduct trade in blood" and held
that the supplying of blood or blood products is not an act in commerce. 15 1 In addition, the court noted the absence of a contract
between the plaintiffs and the blood banks. 152 The full federal
court basically reiterated the holding of the trial court and Judge
Lockhart favorably cited a seminal decision in the New York Court
of Appeals which established that the transfusion of blood to a pa145. 99 A.L.R. 601 (1991), appeal denied, 105 A.L.R. 53 (1991).
146. Id. at 612.
147. For example, the plaintiff utilized the testimony of Dr. Ed Engleman,
Director of Stanford Medical School Blood Center. Id. at 612. Dr. Engleman
was one of early advocates of the necessity of blood bank testing.
148. Trade Practices Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. §§ 71, 74 (1974).
149. E v. Australian Red Cross, 99 A.L.R. 601,655, affd, E v. Australian Red

Cross, 105 A.L.R. 53, 59 (1991).
150. E v. Australian Red Cross, 99 A.L.R. at 663.
151. Id. at 641.
152. Id. at 643.
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tient is part of service and not a sale of goods. 153
Other Australian cases have also denied plaintiffs relief. In
Dwan v. Farquhar,5 4 an HIV positive plaintiff became infected as
the result of a May 31, 1983, operation, but was not diagnosed HIV
positive until December 23, 1986. On February 6, 1987, he sued the
surgeon, the hospital and the Australian Red Cross Society. According to the court, the plaintiff could have overcome the restrictions of the Statute of Limitations if, and only if, "it appear[ed] to
the Court that there [was] evidence to establish the right of action." 15 5 In affirming the Chamber Judge's dismissal of plaintiffs
claim, the court concluded that on "31 May 1983 there was no test
available through which it could be established whether or not a
particular person was an AIDS carrier or whether or not a particular blood product was contaminated by AIDS."' 5 6 Thus the blood
bank could not have taken any action to eliminate high-risk donors.
The court wrote:
It is purely guesswork whether the donor of the blood containing the
virus was a high-risk or low-risk person, whether his condition could
have been known to him let alone to the authorities, or whether the
discouragement of high-risk donors would have prevented this unfortunate occurrence. In the absence of any identification of the relevant
AIDS agent or of any screening test it is impossible to suggest any action which the Blood Bank should have taken at that time which would
probably have prevented
the chain of circumstances which led to the
157
appellant's condition.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur argument
when the plaintiff failed to establish negligence. 158
In H v. Royal Princess Alexandra Hospital for Children, the
court concluded the defendant utilized proper blood collecting procedures and, thus, denied relief to a sixteen-year-old hemophiliac
who had become HIV positive from infected Factor VIII. 1 5 9 In "PQ"
v AustralianRed Cross Society, a jury concluded that the Red Cross
was not negligent because the blood bank acted in accordance with
current blood bank standards. 160
153. E v. Australian Red Cross, 105 A.L.R. at 59 (citing Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954)).
154. 1 Q.R. 234 (1988).
155. Id. at 239 (Thomas, J.).
156. Id. at 238 (Mathews, J.).
157. Id. at 244 (Thomas, J.).
158. Id. at 241.
159. Roger S. Magnusson, Public Interest Immunity and the Confidentiality
of Blood DonorIdentity in AIDS Litigation, 8 AUSTL. B. REV. 226, 228 n.9 (1991-

92) (citing AusT. TORTS REP. 81-000).
160. PQ v. Australian Red Cross Soc'y, 1 V.R. 19, 33 (1992). The Supreme
Court of Victoria examined the particular duty which the Red Cross owed to the
plaintiff and concluded that there had been no breach. The court stressed:
[Wlhether [the Red Cross] fell short of the required standard of care is to be
tested, not by reference to a reasonable person with the defendant's actual
resources of staff, facilities and finance, but by reference a reasonable per-
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The only major reported case providing a remedy to a plaintiff
was BC v. Australian Red Cross Society. 16 1 In BC, the plaintiff
sued the Red Cross for negligently failing to screen the October
1984 blood donation for high-risk donors. The plaintiff succeeded in
obtaining a court order mandating that the Red Cross disclose the
name, address, sex, age, and occupation of the HIV-infected blood
donor. In finding for the plaintiff, the court balanced competing
interests involving the Red Cross' claim of public interest immunity 16 2 and "the harm to the administration of justice which would
be caused by non-disclosure." 16 3 In mandating disclosure, the court
doubted that donors "would be so upset by limited, judicially-supervised disclosure that the blood supply would be jeopardised,"' 6 4
while "the disclosure of material evidence was of 'considerable public importance.'"' 165 The case settled, but left open the issue as to
whether a plaintiff could sue an HIV positive donor personally if he
provided "false or misleading information" to the Australian Red
Cross.' 6 6 However, it is uncertain whether defendant blood banks

will continue to succeed. In many recent cases, plaintiffs allege violations of consumer protection regulations such as the Trade Prac167
tices Act, which classifies blood as a regular good in commerce.
Perhaps more significant than recent legislative enactments is
the increasing willingness of Australian states to compensate HIV
transfusion victims. By early 1991, the State of Victoria paid the
equivalent of $16.7 million to 109 blood product/plasma victims. 168
son with adequate resources available to conduct the enterprise in which
the Red Cross was engaged.
Id. Thus, the court refused to hold the Red Cross to the elevated standard of
care which the plaintiff argued was appropriate. Id.
161. BC v. Australian Red Cross Soc'y, Supreme Court of Victoria, 25 Febru-

ary 1991, appeal dismissed, Australian Red Cross Soc'y v. BC, Supreme Court

of Victoria, 7 March 1991. For judicial comment on the "reasonable and proper"
settlement, see AustralianAIDS Victims Receive Landmark Out-of-Court Payment, REUTERS, May 22, 1991 [hereinafter Australian AIDS Victims]. The
judge further said: "There are many tragic cases which come before this court,
but few as tragic as this."
162. See Magnusson, supra note 159, at 233 (pointing out that, pursuant to
the court's holding in BC, "HIV-infected donors are protected from liability for

injury caused by their donated blood unless they have provided false or misleading information").

163. Id. at 233. The Red Cross' main contention was that the disclosure of
the donor's identity "was a breach of anonymity which would cause apprehension amongst donors, who, fearing public embarrassment, investigation and

possible litigation, would thereafter be reluctant to donate blood." Id.

164. Id. at 232. The plaintiff argued she could not enforce her legal rights
without access to the donor's identity. Id.
165. Id. at 236.
166. Id. at.
167. See Magnusson, supra note 159, at 227 (discussing the role of consumer
statutes in AIDS litigation); see also E. v. Australian Red Cross, 99 A.L.R. at 61

(discussing the plaintiffs allegations of breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation under the Trade Practices Act).
168. 1992

WORLD INSURANCE REPORT,

January 31, 1992.
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The average payment amounted to $153,000.169 In May 1991,
Western Australia agreed to award $4.2 million (United States) to
twenty-two .HIV positive transfusion victims for an average payout
of approximately $200,000.170 At the end of 1992, Queensland paid
thirty-four HIV positive victims $5.04 million by for contaminated
blood infection; the average payment was $148,000 and the highest
payment was $315,000.171 A combination of humanitarianism and
a desire to save millions of dollars in legal costs led the various governments to set up these compensation procedures.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Various countries have shown that litigation is not the most
viable way to resolve HIV transfusion cases. One alternative that
works well is arbitration conciliation. In Massachusetts, the family
of an employee who became HIV positive as a result of a blood
transfusion sued several defendants. 172 A lawyer/conciliator managed to get all parties to settle for $1.15 million with the burden
shared by several defendants. 173 Another viable alternative to litigation involves the creation of a compensatory system similar to the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 17 4 This would
provide swift, certain compensation to HIV transfusion victims
while they are still alive. There has also been discussion of no-fault
compensation based on the British model as well as the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 175 Although the best approach to the HIV transfusion litigation may not be certain, it is
becoming increasingly clear that there is an urgent need for an effective solution to the complicated litigation problems in the American cases.

169. Id.
170. See Australian AIDS Victims, supra note 161.
171. HIV Victims Paid Millions of Dollars, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS
SERV., Dec. 23, 1992.
172. See Barbara Rabinovitz, Case IllustratesBenefits of System, MAsS. LAW.
WKLY., Dec. 7, 1992, at 3.

173. Id.

174. See Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-

Related HIV Infection, 60 DEF. COUNSEL J. 384 (1993) (discussing the compensation of HIV transfusion victims without a showing of the provider's fault). In
his study of alternatives to litigation in cases involving HIV-infected persons,
Garza refers to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 40 U.S.C.

§§ 300aa et seq. (1986), which permits children to recover on a no-fault basis for
injuries incurred during vaccinations. Garza, supra, at 385.
175. Recent Report Analyzes the Safety of Our Blood Supply, MicH. LAW.
WKLY., Nov. 9, 1992, at 21.

